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Abstract
What explains successful democratization? Answering this requires that researchers
identify not only countries that successfully transitioned to democracy, but also those that
began to liberalize—that initiated institutional reforms that move it towards democracy—
but failed to transition. In this paper, we propose a solution that allows researchers more
fully to capture the liberalization period and then classify these episodic events according
to their outcome: successful, failed, or censored episodes of democratization. We identify
the appropriate procedures and data necessary for operationalization of such episodes and
present the first ever dataset of the full universe of democratization episodes 1900-2017,
compare them to existing measures and assess construct validity. We also demonstrate
the value of this approach showing how we can substantially improve upon what we
know about democratization, including their relationship to development, state capacity,
underlying temporal features, and the relationship between patterns of liberalization and
whether a country successfully transitions to democracy.
Introduction
What explains successful democratization? Answering this requires that researchers
identify not only countries that successfully transitioned to democracy, but also those that
began to liberalize—that initiated institutional reforms that move it towards democracy—
but failed to transition. In this paper, we propose a solution that allows researchers more
fully to capture the liberalization period and then classify these episodic events according
to their outcome: successful, failed, or censored episodes of democratization.
Foundational works on the processes of democratization, in combination with observed
global patterns, facilitated the growth of a burgeoning literature on “transitology” in
the 1980s and 1990s. A key finding in the literature is that regime transitions are
highly contextual and indeterminate in nature (O’Donnell, Schmitter & Whitehead, 1986;
Diamond, Linz & Lipset, 1988). The 1974 Carnation Revolution in Portugal set in motion
a reversal from authoritarian rule in Southern Europe, and Latin America followed suit
beginning with the Dominican Republic in 1978. After the tumultuous events of 1989, the
“winds of change” swept over nearly 100 other countries in the former Eastern Bloc, Africa,
and Asia (Neher & Marlay, 1995; van de Walle & Bratton, 1997). In their wake, the study
of transitions took on increasing methodological sophistication, resulting in numerous new
insights on the structural, institutional, and behavioral correlates of democratization (e.g.,
Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Ansell & Samuels, 2010; Bernhard, Nordstrom & Reenock,
2001; Boix & Stokes, 2003; Geddes, 1999; Haggard & Kaufmann, 2016; Mainwaring &
Scully, 1995; Mainwaring & Pérez-Liñán, 2003; Miller, 2015; Pevehouse, 2002; Przeworski
et al., 2000; Reenock, Staton & Radean, 2013; Ross, 2012; Svolik, 2008; Teorell, 2010).
Notwithstanding conceptual and methodological advances that helped to inform our un-
derstanding of the causes and consequences of democratization, contemporary approaches
seem to have forgotten a fundamental insight of the earlier transitions literature—that
liberalization involves complex processes in which many factors interact in long chains
of relationships with uncertain outcomes. Regression analyses, for example, typically
approach this problem by trying to isolate the average effects of a small number of factors.
However, doing so requires a drastic simplification of a complex process. Ignoring that
democratization is the result of many factors interacting with each other, typically over
an extended period of time, obscures how democracy actually develops. This does not
mean that existing studies and approaches are irrelevant only that certain approaches are
limited in how much they are able to reveal.
Contemporary research on the subject is also constrained by a reliance on transitions-
as-events when explaining the processes of democratization. This results in the potential
misspecification of observations in which countries liberalized but failed to fully transition
to democracy. Studies that compare cases that transitioned to democracy to those that
did not require the assumption that the within-category subjects are homogeneous and
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that the effects are symmetrical across categories. To the extent that cases that did not
transition to democracy differ from those that did, this approach risks leading to erroneous
conclusions. This well-known problem—often called Simpson’s paradox—refers to making
incorrect inferences by failing to distinguish between different observations and treating
them as similar to one another (Blyth, 1972; Wagner, 1982).
If cases that liberalized but failed to transition to democracy are meaningfully different
from those that never took steps towards liberalization, the empirical trends that distin-
guish these two distinct types may disappear or reverse as a result of combining them in
the same category. Using regression analysis to estimate the effects of a treatment on a
sample that combines cases that liberalized but never transitioned with cases that never
liberalized makes it difficult to distinguish between factors that increase the likelihood of
a transition towards democracy and those that determine its ultimate success. Further,
denoting cases that failed to transition to democracy after a period of liberalization is also
critical for properly specifying the relevant counterfactuals in analyses that aim to explain
both the process of democratization and the occurrence of a transition. The approach we
advance in this paper addresses these issues.
Liberalization is inextricably connected to the prospects of regime change, but political
openings do not necessarily lead to transitions to democracy. For example, the literature
on competitive autocracies and electoral authoritarianism has pointed to the potentially
stabilizing effects of liberalization on autocratic rule (Brumberg, 2002; Bunce & Wolchik,
2010; Gandhi & Przeworski, 2006; Levitsky & Way, 2010; Magaloni, 2008; Schedler,
2013). Political reforms have also frequently occurred without the explicit aim of creating
democracy, but democratization has been an unintended consequence (Treisman, 2017).
At the early stages of liberalization, the intent of such efforts is often unknown, and the
outcome is highly uncertain. Thus, identifying liberalization events and distinguishing
their trajectories is therefore crucial to understanding the key differences between processes
that stabilize autocracy and those that make a transition to democracy more likely.
In short, the focus on transitions to democracy or assumed-to-be equivalent changes
along an interval measure, and not on the processes and the universe of potential transitions
that can result, limits our ability to answer questions that make up core elements in
the research on democratic transitions the earlier literature pointed to as critical: When
a country moves from autocracy towards democracy (or vice versa), which elements
tend to come first? Are there common patterns by which countries liberalize that fail to
lead to democracy? For policy purposes, answering such questions is essential: Which
determinants of democracy are most exogenous—affecting other components—and least
endogenous—dependent on other components—that would be the ideal targets for democracy
promotion?
To address these issues we suggest a new approach to identifying periods of liberalization
that had the potential to lead to democratization but which were not always successful.
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This approach captures the fundamental uncertainty of the early stages of regime change
(the “liberalization” phase) and avoids the potential for sample bias resulting from focusing
exclusively on cases of successful transitions. It also avoids the assumptions of homogeneous
unit and symmetric effects that characterize most TSCS specifications, opening up a range
of new possibilities for quantitative analysis. Our approach brings together the concepts of
liberalization and transition in the concept of democratization episodes and distinguishes
between successful and failed democratization outcomes. A democratization episode refers
to the period of time over which a regime becomes significantly more democratic, rendering
a more liberal autocratic regime or even facilitating a short-lived or successful transition to
democracy. Thus, it includes liberalization—a period of political opening in an autocratic
setting—and the potential for a transition to democracy that may succeed or fail.
Using estimates of the institutional prerequisites for democracy, as outlined by Dahl
(1971), and whether a country held elections, we construct a dataset of democratization
episodes that entail one of four outcomes, the first three of which we consider failed:
a period of liberalization followed by (1) a return to closed autocracy; (2) stagnation
and the institutionalization of electoral authoritarianism; (3) a short-lived transition to
democracy only to revert back to autocracy quickly, and (4) the successful transition to
democracy. The coding rules that we introduce establishes the full universe of cases that
allows scholars to place bounds around the beginning and end of such episodes and to
compare both successful and failed democratization outcomes. To increase transparency
and ease replication, we also provide, as a public good, an ease-to-use interface—available
as an R-package—that allows users to define their own inclusion parameters.
In this paper, we first outline the conceptualization and operationalization procedures
we use to construct our sample of episodes with data from Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem)
for the period 1900 to 2017 ??(Coppedge et al. 2017, 2018). We describe the resulting
set of episodes, comparing them to existing measures and assessing construct validity.
We also demonstrate the value of this approach for reevaluating findings in the literature
on democratization. Specifying a more complete set of potential cases and denoting the
period over which changes occurred can substantially improve upon what we know about
democratization, including their relationship to development, state capacity, underlying
temporal features, and the relationship between patterns of liberalization and whether a
country successfully transitions to democracy.
Conceptualizing Episodes of Democratization
The key concept of interest is democratization. In broad terms, democratization refers to
a series of substantial institutional changes that improve the democratic characteristics
of a regime. These institutional changes may or may not result in the transformation
of the regime from an autocracy to a democracy. In the classic literature on political
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transitions, this is a process that first involves liberalization—loosening restrictions under
autocracy—and then a transition to democratic practices (e.g., O’Donnell, Schmitter &
Whitehead 1986).
The notion of a clearly delineated transition to democracy is commonly employed in
quantitative analyses of democratization, which use dichotomous measures to indicate
regime change and calculate regime survival (Boix, Miller & Rosato, 2013; Boix & Stokes,
2003; Przeworski et al., 2000). These prior approaches often rely on minimal criteria
to qualify as a democracy and represent transitions as a "switch in time" that occurs
once a country fulfills basic criteria. These binary representations of democratization,
however, mask important qualities that exist alongside institutional practices and affect
the extent to which they reinforce democratic traits. Others take democratization to mean
any move towards a more democratic regime, denoted by increases between a theoretical
minimum and maximum on a latent scale (e.g., Lindberg 2009).1 However, without a
theoretically justified threshold for where on a scale a country becomes a democracy it is
nearly impossible to distinguish liberalization from transition. As a result, this approach
has the potential to confound traits that make countries more democratic (liberalization)
with those that are associated with a country ultimately becoming a democracy.
One way to draw on the strengths of both of these approaches is through the concept
of democratization episodes. We define this as sustained periods of significant institutional
changes in which an autocratic regime becomes more democratic, which may or may
not lead to it meeting minimal requirements to be considered a democracy.2 This
conceptualization has the advantage of taking into account liberalization (movement
towards an open society) while distinguishing it from the outcome (whether a country
surpasses some threshold to be considered a democracy). As Elkins (2000) notes, a graded
measure of democracy enables one to identify incremental effects that would otherwise
not be observed through the use of a dichotomous measure. It also eschews the use
of a specific—often arbitrary—cut-off value that can affect the strength of an observed
relationship. Notwithstanding the value of using the richness of incremental data to test
the effect of democracy level and democratization, certain research questions require
dichotomizing or categorizing information to delineate the sample of outcomes in which
we are interested (Collier & Adcock, 1999). The coding rules that we apply thus create
a bounded set of cases that enable us to identify periods of liberalization and examine
whether or not they successfully democratized.
1For a review of indices of democracy, see Munck & Verkuilen (2002) and Högström (2013).
2This paper is not concerned with the process of a democracy further developing from an electoral
democracy to a liberal democracy.
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Operationalizing Episodes
We rely on the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) data ?(Coppedge et al. 2017, Pemstein
et al., 2017) to operationalize successful and failed democratization episodes. Version
8 of the V-Dem country-year dataset provides data on about 350 specific indicators
for some 180 polities from 1900 to 2017. We base our approach on Dahl’s notion of
polyarchy, which requires that electoral democracies not only hold multi-party elections,
but that these take place in a free and fair political context and include pluralistic
sources of information, and the freedoms of expression and association (Dahl, 1971).
V-Dem’s electoral democracy index (EDI) builds on Dahl’s (1971, 1989) conceptualization,
measuring each of the associated institutions with 25 expert-coded indicators that identify
the extent to which officials are elected and the extent of suffrage, the quality of elections,
freedom of association, and freedom of expression (Teorell et al., 2018).3
In addition to the EDI, our operationalization process also takes advantage of the
Regimes of the World classification scheme (RoW), which uses V-Dem data and the EDI
to classify country-years into four regime-types: closed autocracies, electoral autocracies,
electoral democracies, and liberal democracies (Lührmann, Tannenberg & Lindberg,
2018).4 Identifying and distinguishing between democratization episodes involves four
steps: (1) restricting the sample to liberalization that begins in non-democracies, setting
criteria to denote (2) the beginning and (3) the end of a liberalization period, and (4)
determining whether liberalization resulted in successful democratization. We discuss
these procedures below.
The Inclusion Criterion
A democratization episode is the period of time in which progressive institutional changes
take place. Democratization can be gradual, occurring in a piecemeal fashion across
a long period of time, or sudden and dramatic. Nonetheless, they must start in non-
democratic regimes. This serves as an inclusion condition. It allows us to rule out cases of
electoral democracies becoming more democratic after the initial transition to an electoral
democracy. Therefore, using the RoW measure, we restrict the sample to episodes that
began in closed or electoral autocracies.
Limiting the focus to liberalization occurring in non-democratic regimes is an important
condition. Given the goal of studying democratization and making proper comparisons
between democratization episodes that succeed and those that fail, cases must share a
similar starting point. This also avoids a problem in standard TSCS designs, in which an
3Originally eight, Dahl narrowed them down to six: (1) free, fair, and frequent elections that transfer
legitimate authority to (2) elected officials; (3) freedom of expression; (4) the existence of and access to
alternative information, separate from official government sources; (5) associational autonomy; and (6)
inclusive citizenship.
4The V-Dem variable name for the electoral democracy index is v2x_polyarchy, while the V-Dem
variable tag for the regimes of the world classification scheme is v2x_regime.
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improvement in an already relatively liberal democracy is assumed to mean the same and
have the same relationship to explanatory factors as an equivalent magnitude of change
by which a closed autocracy becomes a competitive electoral regime.
From Potential to Manifest Episodes
The second step of the identification process involves detecting potential democratization
episodes. We do so using empirically-grounded changes in the EDI. Notably, there is no
dataset that explicitly identifies periods of liberalization. Existing indices such V-Dem’s
EDI and the index of democracy from the Polity Project (Marshall, Gurr & Jaggers, 2017)
can be used, but this requires imposing a threshold for which there is no consensus or
accepted practice. Our approach aims to improve on this by outlining an explicit set of
criteria for placing bounds around the beginning and end of liberalization. As with any
sensitive scale-measure, the EDI can register small, inconsequential changes from year to
year.
In order to make our measure of democratization episodes maps closely to our concep-
tualization, it is necessary to remove cases that are not true episodes of democratization.
To do so, we proceed in two steps. To identify the beginning of a potential episode, we
first evaluate whether there was any positive change in a country’s EDI score of at least
0.01 (on a scale from 0-1) from yeart−1 to yeart. We use the 0.01 threshold in order to
capture meaningful institutional change, rather than noise in the measure. While 0.01
may seem like a small change, the majority of the yearly changes in the EDI fall between
-0.01 and 0.01.5 The positive 0.01 threshold captures 2,135 country-years.
Second, to qualify as a manifest democratization episode it is necessary that there is a
sufficient aggregate change in the EDI over the entire episode. We consider a sufficient shift
during the episode to mean that the initial EDI value must be significantly different from
the highest value in an episode based on the standard deviation, xt=1+σt=1 < xt=T −σt=T ,
where x is the EDI value and T is the length of the episode in years. While the standard
deviation (σ) of the EDI varies quite a bit depending on the consensus of the country-
experts, on average this condition requires that there be about a minimum of 0.05 total
change in the EDI score, which covers 5% of the possible range of the variable. We drop
potential episodes that do not meet this criterion. Based these criteria, we identify 316
manifest democratization episodes during the period from 1900 to 2017.
579% of all V-Dem country-year observations (13,395 observations out of the 17,604 observations) see
a change in their EDI scores between -0.01 and 0.01; 5,702 country-years register a positive change of at
least 0.01 from the year prior, which is about 34% of cases. The median positive change is 0.006 while
the mean is 0.025, suggesting that the distribution is highly skewed by a few large positive changes.
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Denoting Episode End
To identify whether the end of an episode resulted in a success or a failure, one must first
establish when it ended. Thus, the third step is to determine when a democratization
episode ends. Operationally, our approach defines three ways to determine an episode’s
end point. The first is that there are ten years of stagnation, meaning that the EDI score
does not change ≥ 0.01 in either direction for 10 consecutive years. While seemingly
arbitrary, ten years typically allow for two consecutive elections in electoral regimes and
enough time in others to reasonably consider any future changes to be part of a new trend
rather than a continuation. Stagnation can occur in democratic as well as in authoritarian
regimes, and can thus be associated with either success or failure.
The second condition for episode termination is a sudden, substantial decrease in
either the EDI or RoW measure. In the case of the continuous EDI, a one-year decrease
of ≥ 0.1 constitutes a sudden, substantial decrease, as it is approximately 2 standard
deviations of the yearly change distribution (0.051) and is thus significantly different from
0 based on standard 95% confidence intervals. While this type of episode-end can indicate
a failure to democratize, it is important to recognize that sudden drops can also occur and
terminate episodes in democracies. For example, a country that democratized and quickly
reached an EDI score of 0.85 could drop down to 0.75; it would stay above the bar for an
electoral democracy, but it would no longer qualify as democratizing. A third disruption
to a democratization episode is a reversion to closed autocracy from any advancement
made on the RoW measure. Therefore, when the yearly change in RoW is negative and
results in a value of 0, the democratization episode is terminated.
Success or Failure?
The fourth and final step is to delineate successful, failed, and censored democratization
episodes. To be classified as successful, a democratization episode must meet the following
two conditions: (1) institutional changes that are substantial enough to make the regime
transition to an electoral democracy, and (2) these gains are maintained during a period
of time that makes it meaningful. We argue that maintaining the democratic quality of
institutions at the level required to be classified as an electoral democracy and practicing
the processes of electoral democracy over at least two consecutive elections (either two
legislative or presidential, or including one constituent election) is evidence that an episode
was successful. Thus, episodes where coups or a swift return to autocracy occur after
briefly achieving electoral democracy are not counted as successful.
As discussed above, failed episodes can be one of three mutually exclusive kinds. The
first is when a country improved significantly but then fell back to being a closed autocracy.
This is indicated by the third rule, stipulated above, for when an episode ends. The
second type of failure results from a process in which a country improved significantly
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on the electoral democracy index, but the process stalled for ten years and did not reach
the threshold to be considered an electoral democracy on the RoW measure. We identify
cases that failed due to stalling (stagnation) by examining the nature of the RoW measure
throughout the duration of the episode. In order to be considered a failed episode, the
country must never become an electoral democracy during the episode (v2x_row ≤ 1),
while at the same time it is not classified as a closed autocracy in the RoW measure for
the entire duration of the episode. The third way for a democratization episode to fail is
by briefly reaching the threshold for electoral democracy but reverting to an authoritarian
regime before completing two consecutive elections as an electoral democracy. The criteria
here are identical to the successful episode, except that the regime dropped back to an
electoral or closed autocracy on the RoW scale within two election cycles. The plots in
Figure 1 illustrates these potential outcomes.
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Figure 1: Possible Outcomes of Liberalization Events
Identifying censored cases enables scholars to systematically compare the effect of
including or omitting censored episodes as a robustness test and to inform inferences
about recent democratization processes. Similar to successful episodes, truncation must
occur after classification to capture only the years that results in the movement away from
autocracy. In practice, this means that an episode concludes either when the transition to
RoW ≥ 1 occurs, or when the final upward movement of 0.01 on the polyarchy index occurs,
whichever comes later. As with most time series data, the problem of right-censorship
occurs as a result of our construction of episodes. A country may not have achieved
successful democratization (not yet held two consecutive elections under democratic
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conditions), but also not have failed based on the criteria outlined above. Further, because
a democratization episode conceptually involves moving towards democracy, we truncate
them to capture only the years that results in the movement from autocracy towards
greater democracy. Operationally, this means that an episode concludes either the year
after the transition to electoral democracy (RoW ≥ 2) occurs, or when the final upward
movement of 0.01 on polyarchy occurs, whichever is later.
Descriptives
According to the coding rules described above, we identified 316 democratization episodes
taking place in 150 countries over 117 years (1900 to 2017). We list information about
each of the 316 episodes in Online Appendix B. We identify 13 ongoing (censored)
episodes that cannot be conclusively classified as either failed or successful, 120 successful
democratization episodes occurring in 99 countries, and 183 failed democratization episodes
across 97 countries. Of these 183 episodes of failed democratization, 70 (38.2%) failed due
to stagnation, 64 (35%) failed by never reaching electoral democracy and experiencing
a swift autocratization to terminate the period of liberalization, and 49 (26.8%) failed
by experiencing a brief period of electoral democracy, but quickly retreating back to
autocracy.
Of the 32 countries in the V-Dem dataset without a democratization episode, 3
maintained democratic rule for the entire period, 22 maintained consistent autocratic
rule for the entire period and 7 experienced a break in their existence, resulting in no
continuous transition.6 We also conducted a sensitivity analysis of the criteria that we
used to identify episodes (Online Appendix C), finding the sample to be largely robust to
alternative threshold values for inclusion. More specifically, while the country-years differ,
running 161,051 unique combinations of threshold values captures all episodes identified
with our initial thresholds, but suggests three additional episodes in the early 20th century
(Denmark, Iceland, Norway).
The concept of a democratization episode we lay out captures quite a bit of variation
within the failed and successful categories, both in duration and magnitude. Indeed, from
prior research—both case study and large-N analyses, one thing is clear: in some contexts
successful democratization processes are very swift, while in other cases these processes are
much more protracted and gradual. Figure 2 presents four countries that exemplify these
different patterns, using our conceptualization and operationalization procedures. As the
6The democratic countries are Australia, Iceland, New Zealand and Switzerland, and the closed
autocracies are Bahrain, Eritrea, Hong Kong, Kuwait, Morocco, North Korea, Oman, Palestine/British
Mandate, Palestine/Gaza, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Sudan, Swaziland and United Arab Emirates.
Armenia, German Democratic Republic, Iceland, Montenegro, Palestine/West Bank, Ukraine and Uzbek-
istan were classified as electoral autocracies for periods of time, but experienced a break in their existence,
resulting in no continuous transition to or from closed autocracy.
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Figure 2: Typical patterns in democratization episodes
figure shows, the case of El Salvador in the 1980s-2000 was more protracted than many
others, such as Brazil in the late 1980s and Lesotho in the early 2000s, where successful
democratization covered a greater magnitude of change, relative to El Salvador, and did
so over a shorter period.
Regarding failed episodes, the difference between swift versus gradual change also
appears. Even within the same country, these two types of episodes occur; in Lesotho,
the first attempt at democratization in the 1950s began quite gradual with no major
movement until the tenth year of the episode. Later, in 1994, Lesotho experienced very
swift democratization efforts (both of which were followed by an immediate backslide
to autocracy). These examples also illuminate the different types of failure. Brazil
and Lebanon in the late 1940s experienced episodes of liberalization that resulted in a
prolonged state of liberalized autocracy, while both failed episodes in Lesotho resulted in
a swift reversal of the liberal gains made during the episode. Lebanon, from the 2000s to
present, is an example of a censored episode in which the outcome is yet unknown.
Of the 120 successful democratization episodes, the average episode last 6.95 years;
however, 41.7% are swift, reaching electoral democracy in 3 years or less from when the
episode began. Among 183 failed episodes the pattern is similar, with 68 cases (37.1%)
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becoming electoral autocracies within 3 years of the episode’s start, with an average episode
duration of 5.31 years. The record length is held by Mali, which took 17 years to move
from closed autocracy to electoral autocracy. While there were observable liberalization
efforts occurring over the entire span from 1945 to 1961, the episode was, nevertheless, a
failure. This variety in both failed and successful episodes indicates that duration and
magnitude are important features to consider when comparing episodes to one another.
Comparison to existing data on transitions
As mentioned earlier, there are several different approaches that researchers have used to
identify when a country transitions to a democracy. One approach is to code a country as
a democracy when it satisfies a set of criteria. Two of the most utilized measures that
take this approach to classification are ?Boix, Miller, and Rosato (2012, hereafter BMR)
and ?Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010, hereafter CGV). Both include some indicator
of the concept of democracy. BMR code a country a democracy if it meets two criteria:
the executive and legislature are popularly elected and a majority of adult men have the
right to vote. CGV classify a country a democracy if the executive and legislature are
popularly elected in multiparty elections and alternation in office occurs under similar
rules. Both of the measures are dichotomous, and researchers often use them to indicate
the year in which a transition to democracy occurred, as well as whether there was a
transition from democracy to some form of autocratic rule.
While the BMR coding rules do not perfectly align with those CGV use, their focus
on free and fair elections at the national level result in their years of transition aligning
quite often. As seen with the examples of Ghana and Cyprus in Figure 3, the two coding
schemes perfectly align in two of the four transitions. And although they disagree on
the timing of transition for successful episodes that we identified in each country, these
indicators remain within 6 years of each other. As a means of validation, and to identify
differences in the samples of cases, we compare the democratization episodes created by
our coding rules to the transitions indicated by each of the two measures.
Of the successful episodes, BMR coded roughly 83% as democratized at some point
during the episode that we identified. However, BMR also coded 38% of failed episodes as
democratized, for which their dichotomous coding has an accuracy of about 61% (i.e., only
61% of the cases they coded as democratized were successful by our standards). That is
not to say that these transitions did not succeed in reaching minimal levels of participation
and contestation, but that often these transitions to democracy did not qualify as electoral
democracies. Likewise, CGV coded roughly 89% of the successful episodes as democratized
at some point. However, CGV coded 45% of failed as democratized as well, for which
their dichotomous coding has an accuracy of about 54% (i.e., only 54% of the cases they
coded as democratized were successful by our standards). Although they met the criteria
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Figure 3: Example episodes with transitions coded by BMR (2012) and CGV (2010)
outlined by CGV to be considered a transition to democracy, the transition did not result
in a stable regime as is required in our definition of a successful democratization episode.
Another approach to indicating democratic transitions is to use a continuous index
that combines information on various dimensions. One example is the Polity score from
the Polity IV Project (Marshall, Gurr & Jaggers, 2017). Ranging from -10 to 10, with
higher values indicating more democratic states, Polity scores are aggregate estimates
of constraints on executive authority, the competitiveness and openness of electoral
participation, and executive recruitment. Concerning regime classification, the Polity
project suggests a three part categorization scheme: countries with scores between -10
and -6 are autocracies, those with scores between -5 and 5 are “anocracies,” and regimes
with scores between 6 and 10 are democracies. While this classification scheme is used
widely throughout the comparative and international relations literatures, a prominent
critique of this approach is that the choice of cut-off is somewhat arbitrary.
To determine how selecting different thresholds affects the inclusion of cases, we
compared the number of episodes that we observed across values of the Polity score.
As Figure 4 illustrates, the proportion of successful episodes that we identified met or
surpassed Polity values up to and including 6. Around 99% of democratization episodes
that we coded as successful reached or exceeded 0, while 90% reached a 6 or higher on
the Polity index. In contrast, the proportion of failed democratization episodes that
met higher thresholds falls precipitously across the index—only 63% and 27% of failed
episodes ever obtained values of 0 or 6, respectively. Notably, comparing the proportion
of successful episodes captured by various thresholds on the Polity index suggests that 6
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Figure 4: Proportion of episodes that met
or exceeded different Polity values
is an appropriate delimiter of those countries that successfully became democracies and
those that did not.
Comparing our sample of democratization episodes to alternative methods for denoting
a transition highlights three important differences between approaches. First, our episodic
approach incorporates yearly observations before and after transitions that vary consider-
ably in duration, suggesting that they capture different paths to the moment of transition.
This allows for systematic investigation of the endogenous development of democratic
features that lead up to and sustain a democratic transition. Second, as the case of
Ghana (Figure 3) shows, the differentiation between failed and successful democratization
attempts is important and lacking from the other transition-centric coding schemes. To
be able to understand how the process of democratization differs for episodes that result
in stable democracy and those that revert to authoritarianism in a systematic manner,
researchers must take this distinction into account.
Finally, the detection of failed episodes that never reached the point of free and
fair elections are absent from existing measures of transition. This makes sense when
attempting to understand the nature of regime change, but for questions regarding
the sequence of institutional development that leads to failed or successful democratic
outcomes, it is imperative that researchers identify these stunted democratization attempts.
With classification schemes that simply code a transition without noting if there is a
subsequent consolidation of democracy, researchers cannot evaluate differences between
successful and failed democratization efforts. Thus, understanding the conditions at the
onset of an episode and the changes that occurred during an episode and determined its
success is a novel contribution of this approach to measuring democratization.
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Evaluating face validity: Examples from Latin America
In addition to the relationship of our coding rules to other measures of the same
phenomenon—or the criterion validity of our approach, we are also concerned with
the extent to which the episodes we identify reflect reality in a sample of cases (Adcock
& Collier, 2001). We assess the content validity of our approach by comparing the set
of outcomes designated by our coding rules to descriptive expectations regarding the
appropriateness of fit. Specifically, we examine the validity of the cases that our coding
rules designated as democratization episodes, but do not explore cases that potentially
should have been coded but were not. Using qualitative information about the events that
transpired over each democratization episode, we evaluated the 53 episodes that occurred
in Latin America. Our selection of cases within the same region aims to leverage these
countries’ similar historical experiences and geographic and demographic characteristics
to ensure a standard of comparison across cases. Here, we explore in-depth the various
democratization episodes that occurred in four countries: Argentina, Mexico, Colombia,
and the Dominican Republic. As depicted in Figure 5, these cases are representative of
the different types of episodes created by our coding rules.
We focus first on the more complex case of Argentina (the upper left panel in Figure
5). As this plot shows, between 1900 and 2017, there were seven democratization episodes
in Argentina, only two of which were successful. The first episode (1912 to 1926) maps
closely to the enactment of universal male suffrage in 1912 and secret-ballots in 1916, the
first election of President Hipólito Yrigoyen in 1916 and the second consecutive election
in 1922 that resulted in the election of Marcelo T. de Alvear. This successful episode
ends just before the re-election of Yrigoyen in 1928, after which we see a sharp drop in
Argentina’s EDI score, the product of a military coup that deposed President Yrigoyen
from office in 1930.
Shortly thereafter, in 1933, we see an uptick in Argentina’s EDI score. Argentina
saw the rise of a new political alliance, Concordancia, in 1932, which helped assuage the
military’s political concerns. While promising in the beginning, political persecutions
of opposition parties, electoral fraud, and pervasive government corruption mired this
liberalization period. This failed democratization episode ended in 1940, the last year
that there was a significant increase (≥ 0.01) in Argentina’s EDI score before the bottom
dropped out due to another military coup in 1943.
We see another short-lived, and failed, Argentine democratization episode beginning
in 1947 and ending in 1948. This period corresponds with the first election of Juan
Perón in 1946, and the drafting of a new constitution in 1947, which granted women the
right to vote. It ended in 1947, as Argentina’s EDI score droped due to the systematic
imprisonment of political opponents of President Perón, the suppression of independent
newspapers, and provisions in the new constitution that strengthened the power of the
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Figure 5: Polyarchy scores with episodes highlighted
president. The first Peronist period came to an end in 1955, after a military uprising
forced President Peron to resign, seeking exile in Venezuela.
The 1958 election, which Arturo Frondizi won, marks the start of fourth Argentine
democratization episode since 1900. Similar to the last two episodes, this democratization
attempt was short-lived, ending in 1961 due to the military’s involvement in politics.
Specifically, after President Frondizi’s failed attempts to lift the military-imposed ban on
the Peronist Party, the Justicialist, Perón loyalist established proxy parties to compete
in the 1962 legislative elections. After Peron loyalists won critical seats, the military
intervened and forced President Frondizi to annul the election results, forcing him and his
vice president to resign. Under the guise of constitutional authority, the military then
appointed Senate President José María Guido as the provisional president followed by the
election of Arturo Umberto Illia in 1963. The return to civilian-rule marks the start of the
fifth, and again failed and short-lived (beginning and ending in 1964), democratization
episode in Argentina. Here too, the military’s involvement in domestic politics, political
infighting, and revenges politics, ultimately led to a military coup in 1966, in which
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General Juan Carlos Onganía seized power.
After a series of coups and counter-coups that punctuated Argentine politics from
1966 to 1971, the military dictator, Alejandro Agustín Lanusse, embattled by economic
turmoil and increasing guerrilla violence by Peronists, saw fit to hold national elections in
1973. These elections and the relatively peaceful transfer of executive power to the winner,
the former president Juan Perón, marks the start of Argentina’s sixth democratization
episode in 1974. This episode also failed within a year. When President Perón died in
July 1974, the vice president, Isabel Martínez de Perón, who was also his wife, ascended to
the presidency. Corruption scandals, political killings, and forced disappearances lead to
impeachment proceedings against the president and, eventually, a military coup in 1976.
Finally, our coding scheme sets 1983 as the start year of Argentina’s seventh democra-
tization episode. Unlike the last five episodes, our coding scheme classifies this episode as
a success. This episode began with the return of the Argentine military to the barracks
following a loss in the Falkland conflict. This is a significant departure from the other
episodes, the failures of which reflect Argentina’s rich history of military interventions
in domestic politics. It ends in 2000, shortly after a series of presidential and legislative
elections.
Mexico is also an exemplary case because of the coding rules’ sensitivity to movements
away from and within an authoritarian regime. As shown in the plot on the upper right of
Figure 5, during the span of hegemonic rule by the Partido Revolucionario Institucional
(PRI) that lasted nearly 70 years, a protracted period of democratization began in 1977.
This year corresponds with the start of a series of electoral reforms. These reforms included
measures to increase the size of the lower house (the Chamber of Deputies) from 237 to
400, 100 of which were set-aside seats for minority parties, and they introduced a limited
form of proportional representation in order to ensure better representation of opposition
parties. These reforms gave opposition parties greater capacity to exert influence at the
national level and reduced the size of PRI electoral majorities. These changes in the quality
of elections indicate a period of liberalization that led to the subsequent replacement of
hegemonic rule.
Through the 1990s, Mexico’s EDI score began a rapid climb, increasing from roughly
0.40 in 1990 to 0.68 in 2000. During this liberalization phase (in 1996, to be specific),
Mexico moved from an electoral autocracy to an electoral democracy. Further, the election
in 2000, the first qualifying election under our coding scheme, saw the first transition
of presidential power between parties in Mexico’s history. The second election in 2006
and the subsequent rise in Mexico’s EDI score until 2010 marks the end of this Mexico’s
successful, if not prolonged, democratization episode.
The panel in the lower right of Figure 5 highlights the three democratization episodes in
Colombia. Politics in Colombia was complicated by a period of violence between Liberals
and Conservatives, which occurred over the period 1948-1958 and represented one of the
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most violent times in Colombia, known as La Violencia. Following the exile of military
leader Gustavo Rojas Pinilla in 1957, the warring parties formed a coalition government
(National Front) in 1958, but its exclusionary nature prompted backlash. The failed
episode that is coded as beginning with the coalition government reflects the conciliation
between parties, but this did not ultimately produce democracy. Another episode began
in 1971 and lasted until 1975; in 1968 the state of siege was lifted and plans were made
to phase out the National Front arrangement, but this did not fully occur until 1974.
Another short but successful episode begins and ends in 1992, which corresponds to a
new constitution that included provisions for religious freedom and guaranteed indigenous
rights. According to the RoW measure, Colombia became an electoral democracy in 1992.
And while its EDI score began to slowly decline shortly after it this transition, which is
why the episode stops at 1992, it did hold two consecutive and successful elections in 1994
and 1998. This case highlights the flexibility of our coding scheme to help account for
both periods of stagnation and periods of modest decline.
Two brief episodes in the Dominican Republic occurred for the periods 1924-1925 and
1963 (the panel on the lower left in 5). Although Horacio Vásquez was elected president in
1924 after U.S. occupation, he was forced to resign in 1930 and Rafael Trujillo was elected
president. The period 1960-1963 was a brief interlude following the resignation of Héctor
Trujillo in 1960. The one-year jump in the Dominican Republic’s EDI score corresponds
to the election of Juan Bosch in 1963, who was replaced by a military junta in the same
year. According to our coding rules, a successful episode of democratization began in
1966 after the U.S. intervened in the civil war and negotiated a truce, and elections
were held. Peaceful presidential succession occurred until the army violently suppressed
uprisings over financial conditions in 1984, which marked the end of the episode. The final
episode occurred over 1995-2000; a new constitution was inaugurated in 1994 that limited
the presidential term and recognized basic human rights, after which regular succession
occurred.
Comparing cases in Latin America shows the sample of episodes representing “successful”
and “failed” transitions to democracy to be face-valid. As in the case of Argentina, failed
episodes can correspond to aborted periods of liberalization caused by military coups.
The criteria for identifying episodes are sensitive to liberalization under authoritarianism
that precedes a transitions to democracy, as Mexico illustrates. At the same time, the
coding rules are able to differentiate negotiated transitions that produced limited reforms,
as demonstrated by the National Front in Colombia. The democratization episodes that
our coding rules identify also correspond to constitutional changes that led to stable
alternation in office, which is consistent with “minimalist” notions of democracy (Cheibub,
Gandhi & Vreeland, 2010).
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Revisiting Existing Debates
Classifying democratization episodes as failed or successful allows us to reexamine some
of the existing explanations concerning the factors that might make democratization
more or less likely. Because our sample includes both successful and failed transitions,
simply describing the difference between the categories provides new insight into this
question. We briefly revisit three major debates in the literature on democratization,
demonstrating how conceptualizing democratization episodes both expounds and builds
upon—and in some ways, challenges—existing research. Specifically, we discuss the notion
that democratization has historically occurred in waves, the impacts of development on
democratization, and debates over whether the timing of democratization matters. In the
Online Appendix D, we provide a discussion on the potential relationship between state
capacity and democratization.
Waves of democratization
Our identification of episodes facilitates a fresh look on Huntington’s (1991) account of
the three waves of democratization. Since 1991, the study of democratization has mainly
focused on transitions to democracy (without taking into account how persistent they
may have been), or on average levels of democracy in the world. Figure 6 displays the
number of countries going through a democratization episode in any given year and which
ones succeeded or failed. This helps highlight the difference in the success rate of each of
these waves, something our approach makes possible to see for the first time.
Overall, the third wave of democratization has affected—and continues to affect—a
far greater share of countries than the first and second wave. This is not news. However,
we also see that the first wave produced the highest success rate to date, with an equal
number of successes as failures. During the second wave following World War II, most
attempts failed, which occurred in many countries after the end of colonization. While
the success rate during the third wave is closer to the trends we witnessed in the first
wave, the censored cases make it difficult to assess the final ratio. That is, the share of
censored (unfinished) episodes outnumbers both the successful and failed episodes since
2000, making the nature of democratization in the 21st century unclear for the time
present.
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Figure 6: Number of ongoing democratization episodes (1900-2016)
By defining democratization episodes the way we do, we can see patterns that are
consistent with the description of past transitions occurring in waves. However, our
approach also helps us show that many of the second-wave democratizers represented
failed efforts, a finding pointed out by scholars who have recently attempted to explain
global patterns of democratic reversals and autocratization (e.g., Lust & Waldner 2015,
Kurlantzick 2013, Lührmann & Lindberg 2018, among others).
Modernization and Democratization
A large portion of the comparative democratization literature assesses the impact that
development, modernization, and wealth might have on the sustainability of a democrati-
zation attempt. Since Lipset (1959), debate has continued about whether, and to what
extent, modernization and development affect democratization (Acemoglu et al., 2009;
Boix, 2003; Bollen & Jackman, 1985; Burkhart & Lewis-Beck, 1994; Haggard & Kaufmann,
2016; Inglehart & Welzel, 2009; Przeworski et al., 2000; Teorell, 2010). However, failing
to denote the beginning and ending of a transition to democracy makes it difficult to
separate factors that affected the likelihood that a transition occurred from those that
affected whether it succeeded. One notable and intractable example in this debate is the
question of whether economic development makes democracy more likely to occur (Lipset,
1959; Przeworski et al., 2000; Przeworski & Limongi, 1997; Boix & Stokes, 2003). As
Geddes (1999) described, there is a general consensus that the conditions for democracy
are more favorable in more developed countries. Conclusions about how development
affects democracy, however, is decidedly mixed. Some research suggests that higher levels
of economic development make transitions to democracy more likely, while others argue
that income does not promote democratization but instead helps to stabilize democracies
once the transition is complete (Przeworski et al., 2000; Przeworski & Limongi, 1997; Boix
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& Stokes, 2003).
Assessments of Lipset’s (1959) conjecture that development makes democracies more
likely—often referred to as modernization theory—are confounded, in part, by the question
of when transitions occurred. The level of development in a country may affect the
likelihood of social and institutional changes that encourage liberalization, but it is, in
turn, partly determined by how democratic a country is in the first place. Specifying a set
of criteria for isolating transition periods is critical for determining whether starting values
differentiate democratizers, how the effects of development on transitions to democracy
differ from their effects on democratic survival, and for honing its relationship to the
duration of a democratization episode.
To contribute to this debate, we assess the relationship between initial level of de-
velopment just prior to the beginning of a democratization episode and the outcome of
that episode. As is common in the literature, we use GDP per capita as a proxy for
development because it is available for all countries in our sample over the entire time
period, which does not apply for other measures of development (e.g., economic inequality
or human development indicators). As Figure 7 shows, there is a clear difference in the
distribution of initial levels of GDP per capita between failed and successful episodes. The
green line in the panel plots the density distribution of the initial GDP at the onset of a
successful democratization episode, while the orange line plots the density distribution of
the initial GDP at the onset of a failed democratization episode.
While there is some overlap in the distributions, there is a clear association between
the GDP per capita level at the onset of a democratization episode and the outcome of
the episode. The average logged GDP per capita for a successful episode is 7.7, while
only 6.9 for failed, suggesting that higher levels of development are associated with a
higher democratization success rate. Lower per capita GDP does not appear to prevent
the success of democratization in a deterministic fashion. We find quite a few cases with
a low level of GDP that ended up having a successful democratization episode. At the
same time, almost no democratization attempt at a very high level of per capita GDP
(above 8.5 on the logged scale) failed.
Timing and speed
With our new approach we can also contribute to debates on the timing of democratization.
Mansfield & Snyder (2007), for example, argued that there may be necessary preconditions
to ensure that a country successfully transitions to a democracy and remains democratic.
This claim is bolstered by the observation that many transitions occur in post-conflict
settings that have proven particularly volatile. As such, they suggested that sequencing
reforms in the process of liberalizing may affect whether a country successfully democratizes.
Underlying the debate over whether certain elements should occur in a particular order is
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Figure 7: Distribution of initial GDP per capita by outcome
also a question of whether the speed of liberalization matters. Although other scholars, such
as Carothers (2007), reject sequentialist arguments for democratization, they encourage a
gradual approach that suggests that successful democratization episodes take longer to
develop. This question is intimately connected to research on autocratic institutions and
electoral manipulation, in which some scholars have argued that quick transitions that
deprive elites of control make successful democratization more likely.
Figure 8 shows that successful episodes on average are longer than failed, which
differ by nearly 8 years. This illustrates how our conceptualization of democratization as
an episodic event and differentiating these democratization episodes according to their
outcome can open up the possibility for investigations looking at different temporal aspects
such as duration and speed. Moreover, using the disaggregated indicators of democracy in
the V-Dem data allows for a more granular understanding of what aspects of democracy
change most and which are more initially different based on outcome, enabling a more
direct test of sequencing arguments.
Opening Up for Sequencing Methods
Many existing theories of democratization (often originating from comparative case-study
literature) suggest interlinked and long chains of factors play an important role during
democratization episodes. The analysis of complex relationships in long causal chains
have proven difficult to even describe with existing quantitative approaches. It has
thus not been possible to test these sequential descriptive propositions properly and
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in a systematic fashion. Indeed, the empirical basis for conclusions about endogenous
interrelationships is generally limited to selected countries (e.g., Capoccia & Ziblatt, 2010).
The few exceptions to this have looked at characteristics such as the timing of suffrage
extension (Dix, 1994), the prior performance of regimes as measured by authoritarian
legacies (Linz & Stepan, 1996; Geddes, 2003; Gandhi & Przeworski, 2006), the age of the
regime (Bernhard, Reenock & Nordstrom, 2003), the number of government turnovers
(Gasiorowski & Power, 1998), or the number of past regime breakdowns (Przeworski et al.,
2000). These studies are nevertheless oriented towards explaining the timing of individual
factors rather than longer chains of interdependent institutional reforms. Our approach
to identifying a sample of democratization episodes, however, makes it possible to draw
upon methods that borrow from genomics and evolutionary biology to differentiate and
analyze processes associated with democratization (Lindenfors, Krusell & Lindberg, 2016;
Lindenfors et al., 2018; Mechkova, Lührmann & Lindberg, 2018; Wang et al., 2017).
Here, we briefly illustrate one way to use the variables that comprise the electoral
democracy index to explore differences in successful and failed democratization episodes.
In particular, we focus on four aspects related to election management bodies and civil
society that are some of the indicators used to construct V-Dem’s electoral democracy
index: election management body (EMB) capacity, EMB autonomy, civil society repression,
and the entry and exit of civil society organizations (CSOs). Using ordinalized versions of
these component variables, we tabulated how often each pair of variables reached a given
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level and how often one preceded the other.
Figure 9 shows the proportion of times that each pair of variables reached a value, and
how often one preceded the other, for successful democratization episodes. The contrasting
image for failed episodes is provided in Appendix A (Figure 10). The results provide
evidence suggesting that EMB capacity either develops in tandem with or precedes EMB
autonomy. In over 90% of the episodes, EMB capacity reached a 2 or higher at the same
time as or before EMB autonomy, which is true for 70% of episodes for a value of 3.
Likewise, civil society repression was either at the same level of improvement or improved
before CSO entry and exit in roughly 87% of successful episodes for a threshold value of
3. Notably, the strength of the observed relationships is not driven by the way in which
the episodes began—only 25% of successful episodes entered the sample with values at or
above 3 for EMB capacity and autonomy, and only about 27% had a 3 or higher for both
civil society repression and CSO entry and exit.
The evidence also suggests that improvements in EMB capacity tend to precede
improvements in the civil society measures in successful democratization episodes. The
extent to which improvements in EMB autonomy precedes improvements in civil society
is somewhat weaker, however. Although the proportions of episodes that reached each
value differ considerably between episodes that did and did not result in democracy, their
relative differences in the order in which variables improved are not as different. This
observation suggests that failed episodes did so not because they followed a different order,
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but because they failed to develop effective election management bodies and a strong civil
society. This is consistent with research on the success of more “liberal” authoritarian
regimes, which often resort to electoral fraud and maintain control over the activity of
civic organizations (Foley & Edwards, 1996; Schedler, 2002; White, 1994).
Two rather intuitive findings from this brief illustration are that EMB capacity is a
strong precedent of EMB autonomy and that civil society repression is a strong precedent
of CSO entry and exit. The more interesting finding is the possible order between EMB
capacity and measures of civil society. On the one hand, it should not be surprising that
EMB capacity would be a precondition for other changes, especially those related to the
quality of elections. It is, however, a noteworthy observation that election management
bodies so strongly differentiate failed and successful episodes and that its development
may create prospects for improvements in civil society. In exploring the contingencies
between specific variables, we also found that order is less of a distinguishing factor of
episode success than level. It nevertheless exemplifies particular attributes that were
unlikely to occur in liberalizing episodes that did not transition to a democracy. Periods
of liberalization that did not produce democracy do not appear to have done so because
of an improper order of development, but because critical elements did not develop.
Among those that did become democracies, however, there is an apparent order in the
improvement of election management bodies and aspects of civil society.
Conclusion
In this paper, we argued that current research on democratization may be limited by a focus
on successful cases and obscurity in when transitions begin and end. Despite empirical and
conceptual gains that point to potential determinants of democratic transitions, the success
of “liberal autocracies” and the unintended consequences of liberalization underscore the
need to differentiate liberalization from the transition to democracy. At the same time,
the two processes are closely connected elements of democratization. Advancing our
collective knowledge of the processes of democratization thus depends on a more nuanced
understanding of the relationship between liberalization and democratic transition, with
all of its complexity and uncertainty. In part, this supports a return to analyses that
aimed to differentiate between modes of transition to assess their impacts on the success
of democratization (Huntington et al., 1991; Munck & Leff, 1997).
We outlined an approach to studying democratization that involves conceptualizing
them as episodes of liberalization that only sometimes succeed. Combining estimates of
the institutional prerequisites suggested by Dahl (1971) with the observation of elections,
we specified a set of coding rules to generate a sample of 316 democratization episodes
over the period 1900-2017, of which 120 could be considered successful. The rules that we
described go some way toward setting coherent and transparent rules regarding prospective
24
episodes and building upon recent efforts to explain successful democratization.
As we demonstrated, using our conceptualization of democratization episodes and
classifying them into failed and successful allows us to revisit existing theories about
factors that influence their success. The descriptive evidence presented shows support for
general findings in the literature regarding global-historical patterns of democratization,
development and state capacity at the onset of an episode, and whether the duration of
democratization matters for its ultimate success. In future work, identifying episodes of
democratization in this way may help to overcome the threat of sample bias and provide
greater insights into how democracy develops.
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Figure 10: Proportion of pairwise precedence
in failed episodes
Online Appendix B Description of all Episodes
In the table below, all of the episodes that are detected in the V-Dem v8 data are listed
in the table below. Included in this table is the start and end years of the episode as well
as whether the episode ended in successful democratization, failed to become a stable
democracy, or if the episode is currently right-censored.
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Country Start_Year End_Year Outcome
Afghanistan 2002 2006 Failed
Albania 1917 1922 Failed
Albania 1947 1947 Failed
Albania 1991 1995 Failed
Albania 1999 2010 Success
Algeria 1956 1963 Failed
Algeria 1997 2006 Failed
Argentina 1913 1926 Success
Argentina 1933 1940 Failed
Argentina 1947 1948 Failed
Argentina 1958 1961 Failed
Argentina 1964 1964 Failed
Argentina 1974 1974 Failed
Argentina 1984 2000 Success
Austria 1919 1918 Failed
Austria 1921 1921 Success
Azerbaijan 1992 1993 Failed
Bangladesh 1973 1974 Failed
Bangladesh 1978 1980 Failed
Bangladesh 1987 1987 Failed
Bangladesh 1991 1997 Success
Bangladesh 2010 2009 Failed
Barbados 1945 1969 Success
Belarus 1992 1992 Success
Belgium 1920 1922 Success
Belgium 1945 1950 Success
Benin 1947 1961 Failed
Benin 1981 1992 Success
Bhutan 2007 2009 Failed
Bolivia 1937 1939 Failed
Bolivia 1953 1960 Failed
Bolivia 1984 2004 Success
Bosnia and
Herzegovina 1997 1999 Failed
Botswana 1960 1970 Success
Brazil 1946 1950 Failed
Brazil 1980 2000 Success
Bulgaria 1991 2007 Success
Burkina Faso 1950 1963 Failed
Burkina Faso 1992 2001 Success
Burkina Faso 2017 2016 Failed
Burma/Myanmar 1946 1961 Failed
Burma/Myanmar 2011 2017 Censored
Burundi 1983 1985 Failed
Burundi 1993 1995 Failed
Burundi 2004 2006 Failed
Cambodia 1952 1956 Failed
Cambodia 1993 1994 Failed
Cameroon 1983 2014 Failed
Canada 1921 1938 Success
Cape Verde 1973 1976 Failed
Cape Verde 1981 1996 Success
Central African
Republic 1947 1960 Failed
Central African
Republic 1988 1994 Failed
Central African
Republic 2006 2006 Failed
Central African
Republic 2017 2017 Censored
Chad 1946 1958 Failed
Chad 1991 1998 Failed
Chile 1933 1971 Success
Chile 1990 2002 Success
Colombia 1959 1959 Failed
Colombia 1972 1975 Failed
Colombia 1992 1992 Success
Comoros 1991 1991 Failed
Comoros 1998 1997 Failed
Comoros 2003 2009 Success
Comoros 2013 2014 Failed
Costa Rica 1920 1921 Failed
Costa Rica 1951 1954 Success
Croatia 1993 2001 Success
Cuba 1937 1941 Failed
Cyprus 1961 2007 Success
Czech Republic 1920 1921 Success
Czech Republic 1991 1991 Success
Democratic Republic
of Congo 1956 1961 Failed
Democratic Republic
of Congo 1999 2007 Failed
Democratic Republic
of Vietnam 1947 1947 Failed
Denmark 1946 1948 Success
Dominican Republic 1925 1925 Failed
Dominican Republic 1964 1963 Failed
Dominican Republic 1967 1983 Success
Dominican Republic 1996 2000 Success
Ecuador 1939 1939 Failed
Ecuador 1948 1957 Failed
Ecuador 1968 1969 Failed
Ecuador 1979 1984 Success
Egypt 1937 1950 Failed
Egypt 2013 2012 Failed
El Salvador 1983 2009 Success
Equatorial Guinea 1960 1969 Failed
Equatorial Guinea 1983 1996 Failed
Estonia 1922 1926 Success
Estonia 1994 1996 Success
Fiji 1964 1977 Success
Fiji 1993 1997 Success
Fiji 2003 2002 Failed
Fiji 2015 2017 Censored
Finland 1918 1921 Success
France 1946 1949 Success
Gabon 1958 1961 Failed
Gabon 1991 2017 Censored
Georgia 1994 1997 Failed
Georgia 2002 2007 Success
Germany 1920 1920 Success
Ghana 1970 1971 Failed
Ghana 1980 1980 Failed
Ghana 1993 2010 Success
Greece 1925 1924 Failed
Greece 1946 1953 Failed
Greece 1975 1984 Success
Guatemala 1946 1951 Failed
Guatemala 1967 1967 Failed
Guatemala 1986 2016 Success
Guinea 1958 1959 Failed
Guinea 1986 1996 Failed
Guinea 2011 2017 Censored
Guinea-Bissau 1991 2001 Failed
Guinea-Bissau 2005 2005 Failed
Guinea-Bissau 2015 2017 Censored
Guyana 1958 1967 Failed
Guyana 1987 2002 Success
Haiti 1952 1951 Failed
Haiti 1988 1988 Failed
Haiti 1992 1991 Failed
Haiti 1994 1998 Failed
Haiti 2007 2007 Failed
Honduras 1950 1950 Failed
Honduras 1972 1971 Failed
Honduras 1981 2007 Success
Hungary 1919 1918 Failed
Hungary 1921 1922 Failed
Hungary 1989 1991 Success
India 1949 1957 Success
India 1978 1979 Success
Indonesia 1946 1957 Failed
Indonesia 1972 1972 Failed
Indonesia 1999 2004 Success
Iraq 2005 2007 Failed
Ireland 1922 1936 Success
Israel 1950 2001 Success
Italy 1945 1953 Success
Ivory Coast 1991 1993 Failed
Ivory Coast 1997 1996 Failed
Ivory Coast 2002 2001 Failed
Ivory Coast 2008 2017 Censored
Jamaica 1939 1973 Success
Jamaica 1980 2016 Success
Japan 1945 1971 Success
Kenya 1957 1965 Failed
Kenya 1991 2003 Failed
Kenya 2011 2013 Failed
Kosovo 2001 2003 Failed
Kyrgyzstan 2011 2011 Failed
Laos 1942 1948 Failed
Laos 1951 1958 Failed
Latvia 1922 1923 Success
Lebanon 1944 1954 Failed
Lebanon 2001 2017 Censored
Lesotho 1953 1967 Failed
Lesotho 1994 1994 Failed
Lesotho 2003 2013 Success
Liberia 1986 1986 Failed
Liberia 1992 1998 Failed
Liberia 2006 2007 Success
Libya 2012 2013 Failed
Lithuania 1920 1922 Success
Luxembourg 1920 1925 Success
Luxembourg 1946 1947 Success
Macedonia 1996 1999 Success
Macedonia 2003 2004 Success
Madagascar 1958 1961 Failed
Madagascar 1988 1994 Success
Madagascar 2014 2015 Failed
Malawi 1961 1964 Failed
Malawi 1977 1979 Failed
Malawi 1993 1995 Failed
Malaysia 1947 1962 Failed
Malaysia 1974 1975 Failed
Maldives 2006 2010 Success
Mali 1946 1961 Failed
Mali 1993 1993 Success
Mali 2015 2017 Censored
Mauritania 1946 1961 Failed
Mauritania 1993 2002 Failed
Mauritania 2008 2007 Failed
Mauritania 2011 2012 Failed
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Mauritius 1949 1984 Success
Mexico 1978 2010 Success
Moldova 1992 1999 Success
Moldova 2008 2011 Success
Mongolia 1991 1993 Success
Montenegro 2000 2003 Success
Mozambique 1992 1998 Failed
Namibia 1981 1995 Success
Nepal 1951 1960 Failed
Nepal 1983 1992 Failed
Nepal 1996 1996 Failed
Nepal 2007 2010 Failed
Nepal 2015 2017 Censored
Netherlands 1919 1923 Success
Netherlands 1946 1980 Success
Nicaragua 1987 1993 Success
Niger 1958 1961 Failed
Niger 1989 1991 Failed
Niger 1994 1994 Success
Niger 2001 2005 Failed
Niger 2012 2012 Success
Nigeria 1979 1980 Failed
Nigeria 1999 2000 Failed
Nigeria 2012 2016 Failed
Norway 1946 1998 Success
Pakistan 1971 1977 Failed
Pakistan 1986 1989 Failed
Pakistan 2003 2017 Censored
Panama 1949 1949 Failed
Panama 1953 1960 Failed
Panama 1980 2000 Success
Papua New Guinea 1947 1975 Success
Paraguay 1991 2010 Success
Peru 1940 1946 Failed
Peru 1951 1957 Failed
Peru 1965 1964 Failed
Peru 1979 1982 Success
Peru 1994 1996 Failed
Peru 2002 2002 Success
Philippines 1945 1954 Failed
Philippines 1983 1990 Success
Poland 1920 1923 Failed
Poland 1990 1992 Success
Portugal 1912 1912 Failed
Portugal 1971 1984 Success
Republic of the
Congo 1946 1961 Failed
Republic of the
Congo 1980 1993 Failed
Republic of the
Congo 2003 2010 Failed
Republic of Vietnam 1948 1956 Failed
Romania 1991 1997 Success
Russia 1988 1994 Success
Rwanda 1956 1962 Failed
Rwanda 2005 2014 Failed
São Tomé and
Príncipe 1991 2011 Success
Senegal 1961 1961 Failed
Senegal 1969 2000 Success
Serbia 1981 2003 Success
Seychelles 1965 1971 Failed
Seychelles 1980 1985 Failed
Seychelles 1991 2016 Success
Sierra Leone 1952 1963 Failed
Sierra Leone 2003 2003 Success
Singapore 1956 1959 Failed
Singapore 1969 1981 Failed
Slovakia 1996 1999 Success
Slovenia 1991 1992 Success
Solomon Islands 1961 1990 Success
Solomon Islands 2003 2004 Failed
Solomon Islands 2008 2015 Success
Somalia 1942 1964 Failed
Somaliland 2002 2011 Failed
South Africa 1991 2010 Success
South Korea 1947 1949 Failed
South Korea 1965 1964 Failed
South Korea 1982 2000 Success
Spain 1932 1934 Success
Spain 1968 1980 Success
Sri Lanka 1949 1949 Success
Sri Lanka 1994 1995 Failed
Sri Lanka 2011 2017 Censored
Sudan 1950 1956 Failed
Sudan 1965 1966 Failed
Sudan 1987 1987 Failed
Sudan 2011 2017 Censored
Suriname 1950 1950 Success
Suriname 1977 1976 Failed
Suriname 1988 1990 Success
Sweden 1918 1922 Success
Syria 1947 1948 Failed
Syria 1954 1955 Failed
Syria 1962 1962 Failed
Taiwan 1988 2012 Success
Tanzania 1959 1963 Failed
Tanzania 1982 1996 Failed
Thailand 1934 1935 Failed
Thailand 1974 1976 Failed
Thailand 1980 1989 Failed
Thailand 1995 2001 Success
Thailand 2009 2012 Failed
The Gambia 1961 1963 Failed
The Gambia 1967 1978 Failed
The Gambia 1997 2012 Failed
Timor-Leste 1999 2008 Success
Togo 1947 1960 Failed
Togo 1992 1995 Failed
Togo 2004 2008 Failed
Togo 2012 2014 Failed
Trinidad and Tobago 1937 1992 Success
Tunisia 2012 2016 Failed
Turkey 1947 1951 Failed
Turkey 1963 1967 Success
Turkey 1983 2003 Success
Uganda 1957 1963 Failed
Uganda 1982 1981 Failed
Uganda 1990 1997 Failed
Ukraine 1993 1996 Failed
Ukraine 2006 2008 Success
United Kingdom 1920 1930 Success
United States of
America 1920 1932 Success
Uruguay 1916 1920 Failed
Uruguay 1923 1926 Success
Uruguay 1939 1947 Success
Uruguay 1985 2010 Success
Vanuatu 1971 1981 Success
Venezuela 1937 1948 Failed
Venezuela 1959 1989 Success
Yemen 1989 1992 Failed
Zambia 1964 1965 Failed
Zambia 1991 2009 Success
Zanzibar 1994 2011 Failed
Zimbabwe 1980 1991 Failed
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Online Appendix C Sensitivity Analysis
To identify democratization episodes, the algorithm we developed takes into account five
parameters: (1) whether a country’s EDI score increased from the year prior ≥ 0.01, (2)
whether the cumulative change during a potential episode was ≥ 0.10, (3) whether a
country’s EDI score decreased from the year prior ≤ −0.02, (4) whether the cumulative
change during a potential episode was ≤ −0.10, and (5) whether there was little to no
change in a country’s EDI score for ten consequtive years (stasis years). To assess changes
to these thresholds affects the probability that any given country-year is included in our
sample—i.e., how sensitive our sample is to these paramter choices, we considered eleven
equally spaced values centered on our chosen threshold. This yielded 115 = 161, 051
unique combinations of the values.
First, we identified all of the episodes under each of these combinations. Next, we
aggregated these by computing for each country-year the probability that it belongs to an
episode, and whether the episode is successful, failed, or censored. In the aggregation,
we weighted episodes according to the thresholds that yielded them. Table 2 shows the
threshold values and weights.
Threshold
OI CI OD CD SY Weight
1. 0.005 0.05 -0.015 -0.05 5 0.025
2. 0.006 0.06 -0.016 -0.06 6 0.050
3. 0.007 0.07 -0.017 -0.07 7 0.075
4. 0.008 0.08 -0.018 -0.08 8 0.100
5. 0.009 0.09 -0.019 -0.09 9 0.150
6. 0.010 0.10 -0.020 -0.10 10 0.200
7. 0.011 0.11 -0.021 -0.11 11 0.150
8. 0.012 0.12 -0.022 -0.12 12 0.100
9. 0.013 0.13 -0.023 -0.13 13 0.075
10. 0.014 0.14 -0.024 -0.14 14 0.050
11. 0.015 0.15 -0.025 -0.15 15 0.025
Table 2: Threshold values tested in the sensitivity analysis and their aggregation weight.
OI – one-year increase, CI – cumulative increase, OD – one-year decrease, CD –
cumulative decrease, SY – stasis years.
Figure 11 shows how often the country-years we identified in the main analysis end
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up nested in episodes identified in the sensitivity analysis. Country-years that were not
included in the main analysis episodes rarely feature in episodes identified under different
threshold values, and country-years identified in the main analysis were also identified as
episodes across our sensitivity analysis. Only a small fraction of them had an inclusion
probability below 0.5. In short, whether a country-year was identified as a part of an
episode is largely insensitive to the evaluated thresholds. This is further evidenced in
Figure 12. All main analysis episodes were identified under the great majority of the tested
threshold combinations. Only three episodes that were not identified in the main analysis
featured under most of the combinations. All three are early 20th century successful
examples (Iceland, Denmark, and Norway).
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Successful Episodes
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
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Country−Year Inclusion Probabilities
Figure 11: Distributions of episode inclusion probability in the sensitivity analysis by
episode type under the main thresholds.
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Figure 12: Episodes identified in the main analysis (indicated by background color) and
summaries of episodes found in the sensitivity analysis (shown by line thickness and
color). Only countries with at least one episode found in the main or sensitivity analysis
shown. Continued below.
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Figure 13: Figure 12 continued.
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Figure 14: Figure 12 continued.
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Figure 15: Figure 12 continued.
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Figure 16: Figure 12 continued.
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Figure 17: Figure 12 continued.
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Figure 18: Figure 12 continued.
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Figure 19: Figure 12 continued.
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Figure 20: Figure 12 continued.
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Online Appendix D Discussion of State Capacity
The state capacity of a regime at the onset of a democratization episode is likely to
have competing effects on the outcome. While it has been noted coercive capacity alone
increases the longevity of an authoritarian regime (Bellin, 2004; Way, 2005; Levitsky
& Way, 2010; Slater, 2012), the level of extractive capacity has been seen to increase
the likelihood of democratization and democratic consolidation (Ross, 2004; Baskaran,
2014; Slater & Fenner, 2011; Fortin-Rittberger, 2014). The primary distinction between
these two forms of state capacity in terms of democratization outcomes is that extractive
capacity in the form of taxation directly involves the citizenry in the funding of regime
policies. As such, this is thought to drive more representation and responsiveness on the
part of the regime (Baskaran, 2014). Coercive capacity on the other hand, which may or
may not rely on taxation for its funding, has a more clear connection to regime stability
through both repression and security. While the literature is mixed on the expected
relationship between capacity and democratization, examining these two types of capacity
can provide further insight.
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Figure 21: Difference in initial extractive and territorial capacity by outcome
Using two indicators from the V-Dem v8 dataset (Coppedge et al., 2018) which measure
two different aspects of state capacity—extractive capacity and coercive capacity—, we can
evaluate how these theories about the influence of the strength of the state on democratic
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development match up to the data presented here. In Figure 21, the left panel displays
the distributions of extractive capacity based on the state’s fiscal capacity (v2stfisccap)
and the right panel displays the distributions of coercive control as operationalized by the
territorial control that a state has in terms of percent of territory effectively controlled
(v2svstterr). As above, the distribution of the successful episodes is in green and the failed
episodes is in orange.
Figure 21 illustrates that successful and failed episodes are distributed differently
when it comes to extractive capacity. The average values of these distributions are 2.9 for
successful and 2.2 for failed, with clearly distinct modes. The same cannot be said about
territorial control. For both successful and failed episodes, the distributions are highly
left skewed with similar mean values; 89.5 and 85.9 for successful and failed episodes,
respectively. These findings support both strains of the capacity and democratization
literature presented here, showing that higher levels of extractive capacity lends itself to
much more distinct and positive democratization outcomes than coercive capacity.
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